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Abstract
The United States Supreme Court is increasingly forsaking its role as legal interpreter for
the role of legal author due to a transformation in Constitutional interpretation. In
interpreting the Constitution in a manner inconsistent with the original intent of the
Constitution, the rule of law is circumvented. In order to maintain a separation of powers
necessary for governance according to rule of law principles, the U.S. Supreme Court
must return to its correct role as interpreter of law. The Supreme Court's interpretation of
the Establishment Clause illustrates the current difficulties surrounding the lack of a
standard of interpretation. This thesis suggests that the only solution for the relative basis
of Constitutional meaning is to abandon a relative view of the Constitution as a living
document and to consider once again the original intent of the framers of the
Constitution.
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Through the Looking Glass of Constitutional Interpretation
The United States Supreme Court is increasingly forsaking its role as legal
interpreter for the role of legal author due to a transformation in constitutional
interpretation. Because the Constitution is interpreted in a manner inconsistent with its
original intent, the rule of law is circumvented. In order to maintain a separation of
powers necessary for governance according to rule of law principles, the U.S. Supreme
Court must return to its correct role as interpreter of law.
Though the British system of government from which the Americans declared
independence was based upon an unwritten system of Common Law, the United States of
America would be built upon a different foundation — a written constitution. The U.S.
Constitution would serve as the legal foundation of American government. While few, if
any, will deny that America's Constitution is in fact the supreme law of the land, many
will debate exactly what that supreme law means.
This thesis addresses the meaning of the U.S. Constitution as interpreted by the
Supreme Court. Section II will compare interpretivist and noninterpretivist methods of
adjudication such as textualism, originalism, modernism, and pragmatism. Section III
will briefly review the history of constitutional interpretation. Section IV will examine
how the current High Court is slowly removing America from her shelter of protection
under the rule of law by increasingly interpreting the U.S. Constitution apart from its
original design. In order to examine this changing interpretation, Section IV will provide
an in depth analysis of the difficulties created by the High Court's transformation of the
Establishment Clause's meaning and present various interpretations of that clause.
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Finally, Section V will consider the interpretative method of originalism as a remedy for
the relativity pervading constitutional adjudication in America today.
Different Methods of Interpretation
While there are numerous approaches that judges may take when interpreting the
U.S. Constitution, there are primarily two categories of constitutional interpretation. One
constitutional law text describes these two differing approaches as interpretivism and
noninterpretivism.1 These categories divide judges based upon their view of the
Constitution as static or evolutionary in nature.2 This section will examine both
approaches, including some of the benefits and difficulties of each method.
Interpretivist Approaches
Interpretivists argue either that the text of the Constitution itself and/or the
original intent of its authors should serve as the sole authority in constitutional
interpretation.3 Interpretivists hold that judges may not exceed the limits of the text and
its intention when discovering its meaning.4 Interpretivists fall into primarily one of two
categories: textualists or originalists.5 A third but rather uncommon category of
interpretivists focuses upon the principles enshrined in the Constitution rather than
strictly the text or the original intent.6
1

Otis H. Stevens, Jr. & John M. Scheb II, American Constitutional Law: Sources of
Power and Restraint 48-9 (2008).
2

Id.

3

Gary L. McDowell, Interpretivism and Noninterpretivsm, in The Oxford Companion to
the Supreme Court of the United States 436, 437 (Kermit L. Hall ed., 1992).
4

Id. at 436.

5

Id.

6

Steven D. Smith, What Does Constitutional Interpretation Interpret? in Expounding the
Constitution: Essays in Constitutional Theory 21, 32 (Grant Huscroft ed., 2008).
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Textualist approach. One interpretivist approach to interpreting the U.S.
Constitution is textualism, whereby the objective meaning of the words themselves in
their historical context serves as the standard of interpretation.7 Textualists would hold
that if a word's meaning within its historical context means A, even if the intention of the
framer was B, A's meaning should prevail.8 So, if a letter was discovered detailing the
intention of one of the Constitution's drafters, that intention would be irrelevant to the
textualist who is only concerned with the historically consistent meaning of the words
themselves.9 Occasionally, textualists will consider other outside sources in order to
"scope out common patterns of word usage in earlier historical periods."10 Additionally,
textualists evaluate the overall constitutional structure in order to discern the meaning of
the passage.11 However, there is no consensus embracing textual meaning as the
legitimate source of constitutional interpretation.12 Furthermore, simply considering the
text of the Constitution alone rarely provides sufficient answers to difficult cases that
reach the Supreme Court.13 In order to solve most judicial questions, something else
must be considered beyond the text.14

7

Id. at 27.

8

Id.

9

Robert H. Bork, The Tempting of America: The Political Seduction of the Law 144

(1990).
10

Daniel A. Farber & Suzanna Sherry, Judgment Calls: Principles and Politics in
Constitutional Law 28 (2009).
11

Id.

12

Antonin Scalia, Review of Steven D. Smith's Law's Quandary, 55 Cath. U.L. Rev. 687,
692-3 (2006).
13

Christopher N. May & Allan Ides, Constitutional Law National Power and Federalism:
Examples And Explanations 36 (2007).
14

Id.
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Originalist approach. The interpretivist method of originalism is similar to
textualism in that it focuses upon the actual text of the Constitution. However,
originalists also consider the historical meaning of the Constitution in order to discover
the meaning of its words. 15 The principles that the drafters of the Constitution included
in that text also serve as a source of consideration.16 Moreover, those holding to an
originalist interpretivist approach place a value upon historical documents delineating the
drafters' understanding of its meaning.17 According to Associate Supreme Court Justice
Antonin Scalia, "It is essential to originalism, as it is not to so-called ‘evolutionary
constitutional jurisprudence,’ to know the original meaning of constitutional
provisions."18 Originalism, simply put, seeks to discover what the original authors of the
Constitution intended when they penned it.19
Originalism finds its strength in its proposed objectivity as well as security under
the rule of law that it affords.20 However, one of the problems that opponents of
originalism often raise is the difficulty of knowing the actual intent of the founders.21
Nonetheless, by consulting the numerous writings of the founders and their early

15

Farber, supra note 10, at 27.

16

Keith Whittington, How to Read the Constitution: Self-Government and the
Jurisprudence of Originalism (2006), http://www.heritage.org/research/reports/2006/05/how-toread-the-constitution-self-government-and-the-jurisprudence-of-originalism.
17

Id.

18

Antonin Scalia, Scalia Defends Originalism as Best Methodology for Judging Law
(April 30, 2010), http://www.law.virginia.edu/html/news/2010_spr/scalia.htm
19

Steven G. Calabresi, Originalism: A Quarter-Century of Debate 152 (2007).

20

Id.

21

Alan Brownstein, The Reasons Why Originalism Provides a Weak Foundation for
Interpreting Constitutional Provisions Relating to Religion, 2009 Cardozo L. Rev. De Novo 196,
216 (2009).
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constitutional convention debates, the question of what they intended can be properly
ascertained.22 Additionally, some critics of originalism assert that its judicial proponents
are not consistent in applying original intent to decisions they make.23 Steven Smith
states, "Even committed 'originalists' may concede that [free] speech decisions cannot or
should not rest on interpretations of original intentions or understandings."24 Therefore,
these critics argue, originalism is not a coherent doctrine consistently held by those who
espouse it. However, such an argument does not address the validity of the approach; it
simply criticizes adherents of the originalist approach.
One of the preeminent problems with the originalist approach is, according to its
critics, that "the modern scope of judicial review is rigorously circumscribed by original
intentionalism because the eighteenth-century framers had few, if any, clear intentions
about our twentieth century problems."25 Such skeptics ask whether changed conditions
should not demand a different understanding of constitutional principles.26 Nevertheless,
originalism does not require asking "what would Madison do in such a situation, or even
what did Madison do in such a situation, but what does the principle that Madison and his
fellows wrote into the Constitution require in such a situation."27 Thus, as originalist
Robert Bork has argued, even though the framers of the Fourth Amendment's prohibition

22
23

David Barton, Original Intent: The Courts, the Constitution, & Religion 21 (1996).
Brownstein, supra note 21, at 216.

24

Smith, supra note 6, at 27.

25

Phillip Bobbitt, Constitutional Fate: Theory of the Constitution, 94 (3) Ethics 501, 502

26

Brownstein, supra note 21, at 216.

27

Id. (emphasis added).

(1984).
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of unreasonable searches and seizures could not have had electronic eavesdropping in
mind, the prohibition logically extends that far.28
Further, Smith proposes that while considering original intent as a valid normative
interpretive approach, it is not a descriptive presentation of how judges currently interpret
the Constitution. Smith concludes, "Whatever its virtues or deficiencies, the enactors'
intentions answer cannot provide a satisfactory overall descriptive account of
constitutional interpretation as we know it and practice it."29 Though this paper does not
suggest that originalism provides a descriptive account of the current method utilized by
the majority of Supreme Court Justices, it does suggest that originalism provides a valid
alternative to the current methods utilized by the Court. In conclusion, while there are
some difficulties in practically applying the originalist method, originalism offers an
objective approach to interpreting the Constitution.
Constitutional principles approach. Finally, the last method in the category of
interpretivist approaches is one that takes into consideration the principles embodied in
the Constitution. However, this method of interpretation, while appealing, requires
knowledge of the complicated process of identifying and interpreting the principles
enshrined in the text of the Constitution.30 Proponents of the 'Constitution-as-principles'
position contend that the object of constitutional interpretation is the identification of
some set of political-moral facts that the Constitution somehow references.31 The
principles approach is an attractive one, as most individuals favor prioritizing virtues
28

McDowell, supra note 3, at 437.

29

Smith, supra note 6, at 27 (emphasis added).

30

Id. at 29.

31

Id. at 30.
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such as goodness, justice, or morality.32 Once again, the same difficulties that arise with
the methods of textualism and originalism arise with the principles approach — how does
one know what principles are in fact a legitimate bases for interpreting the Constitution?
There seems to be no consensus among judges as to which principles are proper to use as
an interpretive basis. The principles method is another standard that is more of a reform
proposal than a descriptive explanation of what is actually happening in the arena of
constitutional interpretation.33 Many individuals do not hold to one view exclusively.
Occasionally, numerous readings or a hybrid reading can be seen even within one judicial
opinion.
Noninterpretivist Approaches
In addition to these preceding interpretivist methods of adjudication, there are a
few methods characterized as noninterpretivist, two of which are instrumentalism and
pragmatism.34 The difference between these noninterpretivist approaches lies in their
reliance upon the intentions of the founders as justification.
Modernist approach. Modernists, also called instrumentalists, claim that the
intent of the framers of the Constitution actually necessitates a noninterpretivist
approach.35 Modernists suggest that the authors of the U.S. Constitution were
deliberately vague, with no declaration of how judges should interpret it, and who are
therefore free to engage the document in accordance with the changing necessities of

32

Id.

33

Id. at 32.

34

McDowell, supra note 3, at 437.

35

Edward Sidlow & Beth Henschen, America at Odds 337 (2007).
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time.36 Thomas Jefferson could be seen as endorsing a sort of modernism when he
stated:
I am certainly not an advocate for frequent and untried changes in laws and
constitutions . . . But I know also, that laws and institutions must go hand in hand
with the progress of the human mind. As that becomes more developed, more
enlightened, as new discoveries are made, new truths discovered, and manners
and opinions change with the change of circumstances, institutions must advance
also, and keep pace with the times . . .37
Hence, modernists, or instrumentalists, treat the Constitution as a living document that
adapts to the changing needs of society and interpret it as if it were ratified today.38
Pragmatic approach. Pragmatists, on the other hand, do not rely upon the
intention of the framers to justify their noninterpretive approach.39 They claim that the
changing needs of society require flexible interpretations informed by precedent, statutes,
and the Constitution rather than upon the intention of the Constitution's authors.40
Numerous Supreme Court Justices fall within the category of "pragmatists," including
Holmes, Brandeis, Frankfurter, Jackson, Douglas, Brennan, Powell, Stevens, White, and

36

Id.

37

Gottfried Dietze, In Defense of Property 258 (1995).

38

R. Randall Kelso, Statutory Interpretation Doctrine on the Modern Supreme Court and
Four Doctrinal Approaches to Judicial Decision-Making, 25 Pepp. L. Rev. 37, 57 (1997). Trop v.
Dulles provides a great illustration of an instrumentalist reading of the Constitution. In Trop v.
Dulles, then Chief Justice Warren established what would become a dominant basis for future
Supreme Court decisions. In the case, Justice Warren made the bold declaration in reference to
the Eighth Amendment, "The [Constitutional] Amendment must draw its meaning from the
evolving standards of decency that mark the progress of a maturing society." Trop v. Dulles, 356
U.S. 86, 101 (1958). Chief Justice Warren's decision to declare a constitutional Amendment
bound to the changing preferences of society set the Court upon a dangerous trail leading even
farther away from the original meaning of the Constitution.
39

Robert Justin Lipkin, Constitutional Revolutions: Pragmatism and the Role of Judicial
Review in American Constitutionalism 126-7 (2000).
40

Richard A. Posner, Pragmatic Adjudication, 18 Cardozo L. Rev. 1, 5 (1996).
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now Breyer.41 Nevertheless, without reference to the text or the intentions of the framers,
the only source of interpretive justification is precedent. Some of these judges, including
the renowned judge Richard Posner, however, do not even believe that it is necessary to
rely upon precedent; rather, these "pragmatist" judges simply ask the question of results:
what decision will bring about the most good in society or promote stability? 42 Thus, the
pragmatist noninterpretivists have no final standard other than utilitarianism with which
to legitimize their decisions.
Consequences of utilizing a noninterpretivist approach. Despite the
differences among the various noninterpretivist approaches, noninterpretivist adherents
are united by their rejection of interpretivists' claim that "noninterpretivism would either
require or permit courts to ignore the written Constitution and its authoritative effect."43
However, Michael Perry, a noninterpretivist, concludes that decisions reached utilizing
such an approach have "no plausible textual or historical justification."44 Perry further
acknowledges that there is "no way to avoid the conclusion that noninterpretive review,
whether state or federal action, cannot be justified by reference either to the text or to the
intentions of the framers of the Constitution."45 Without reference to the text itself or the
intentions of the framers, noninterpretivists must rely upon their own judgment as to what

41

Id.at 2.

42

Michael C. Dorf, Create Your Own Constitutional Theory, 87 Calif. L. Rev. 593, 596
(1999); Richard A. Posner, Against Constitutional Theory, 73 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 1, 11-12 (1998).
43

Richard B. Saphire, Making Noninterpretivism Respectable: Michael J. Perry's
Contributions to Constitutional Theory, 81 (4) Mich. Law Rev. 782, 785 (1983).
44

Michael J. Perry,The Constitution, the Courts, and Human Rights: An Inquiry into the
Legitimacy of Constitutional Policymaking by the Judiciary 11 (1982).
45

Id. at 24.
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the changing demands of society require. Oliver Wendell Holmes summarizes the
noninterpretivist method:
The life of the law has not been logic, it has been experience. The felt necessities
of the time, the prevalent moral and political theories, intuitions of public policy,
avowed or unconscious, even the prejudices judges share with their fellow-men
have a good deal more to do than the syllogism in determining the rules by which
men should be governed.46
Therefore, by reinterpreting the Constitution in a manner that changes its meaning rather
than following the established process for amending the Constitution, noninterpretivists
render the Court a continuing constitutional convention.
History of Constitutional Interpretation
In order to understand what the drafters of the Constitution actually intended
when they penned the supreme law of the land, one must first determine whose intentions
should be included in such an analysis and what their intentions actually were.47 The
intentions of the convention delegates who ratified the Constitution must be considered.48
The opinions of those who influenced the drafters of the Constitution and the interpretive
positions of the early Supreme Court should be considered as well. This section will
provide a brief summary of such a history of constitutional interpretation. Following this
is an examination of the major changes in the Supreme Court's method of constitutional
interpretation.

46

Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr., The Common Law 1 (1881).

47

William Anderson, The Intention of the Framers: A Note on Constitutional
Interpretation, Vol, 49, No. 2 The American Political Science Review 340, 342 (1955).
48

Id.
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Early Intentions
For centuries, judicial decision-making simply relied upon interpreting the law.
Robin West asserted, "That adjudication consists primarily of the interpretation of texts is
a very old claim — its roots lie in Blackstone's insistence that adjudication is primarily
the discovery, not the creation of law."49 According to Blackstone,50 the spirit and reason
of the law must be taken into consideration when applying debatable law to particular
cases: "But, lastly, the most universal and effectual way of discovering the true meaning
of a law, when the words are dubious, is by considering the reason and spirit of it; or the
cause which moved the legislator to enact it. For when this reason ceases, the laws itself
ought likewise to cease with it."51 It is significant that Blackstone held firmly to the
belief that adjudication requires interpretation in light of the motivation of the law's
author because:
It was from Blackstone that most Americans, including John Marshall, acquired their
knowledge of natural law . . . Blackstone remained the standard manual of law until the
publication of the Commentaries on American Law (1826-1830) of Chancellor James
Kent of New York..52

49

Robin L. West, Adjudication Is Not Interpretation: Some Reservations About The
Law-As-Literature Movement, 54 Tenn. L. Rev. 203, 205 (1986).
50

Many consider Blackstone's Commentaries the best exposition of English Common
Law. James McClellan, Liberty, Order, and Justice: An Introduction to the Constitutional
Principles of American Government 33 (2000). Constitutional scholar Donald Lutz stated that,
"A trenchant reference to Blackstone could quickly end an argument." Donald Lutz, The Relative
Influence of European Writers on Late Eighteenth-Century American Political Thought 78 The
American Political Science Review 189, 196 (1984).
51

William Blackstone, Blackstone's Commentaries on the Laws of England 61 (1765),
http://avalon.law.yale.edu/18th_century/blackstone_intro.asp#1.
52

Robert K. Dorman & Csaba Vedlick Jr., Judicial Supremacy: The Supreme Court on
Trial 10 (1986).
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Blackstone was so influential in America that Edmund Burke stated, "They have sold as
many of Blackstone's Commentaries in America as in England."53 If Blackstone, the
legal authority during the time of the Constitution's formulation, asserted that
adjudication relies upon interpreting legal texts in light of the intention of the text's
author, it is reasonable to presume that the drafters of the Constitution, being highly
influenced by Blackstone, held to a similar belief.54
Throughout the history of Anglo-American jurisprudence, interpretation of the
law was presumed to be the legitimate province of judges. However, with the creation of
the United States Constitution in 1787, a new type of law appeared on the scene of
history –– a written constitution. Beginning with the Mayflower Compact (1620) and the
Fundamental Orders of Connecticut (1639), both states as well as the federal government
would establish a form of government based upon written laws that would serve to
govern both rulers and those ruled. America's unique rule of law tradition, built upon
British charters such as the Magna Carta (1215) and the English Bill of Rights (1689),
would serve as a subsequent model for the rest of the world. Today, written constitutions
epitomize what it means to be an independent state in the contemporary world.55

53

Barton, supra note 22, at 216.

54

According to Donald Lutz's analysis of European writers upon Americans during the
founding era, "Blackstone is the second most prominent secular writer [cited] during the founding
era." Donald Lutz, The Relative Influence of European Writers on Late Eighteenth-Century
American Political Thought 78 The American Political Science Review 189, 193 (1984). Most of
the delegates to the Convention were well versed in English Common Law, and their legal
perspectives were highly influenced by English Common Law. James McClellan, Liberty, Order,
and Justice: An Introduction to the Constitutional Principles of American Government 32-33
(2000).
55

Martin Edelman, Issues Facing The Judiciary: Written Constitutions, Democracy And
Judicial Interpretation: The Hobgoblin Of Judicial Activism, 68 Alb. L. Rev. 585, 586 (2005).
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While the founders of the United States would have the benefit of the writings of
men such as Blackstone, they would not model government strictly after any other
system. Instead, they would create a government wholly unique — built upon a written
Constitution. In May 1787, the Constitutional Convention met in order to draft what
would become the Constitution of the United States of America, which incorporated the
intentions of the fifty-five men who constituted the Convention and, later, ninety more
who debated the Bill of Rights.56 The writings of these men are highly informative
relative to this discussion on constitutional interpretation.
In order to ensure the government of the United States would remain within its
jurisdiction, the founders created a written Constitution. James Madison, known as the
father of the Constitution, stated the following:
What is government itself but the greatest of all reflections on human nature? If
men were angels, no government would be necessary. If angels were to govern
men, neither external nor internal controls on government would be necessary. In
framing a government which is to be administered by men over men, the great
difficulty lies in this: you must first enable the government to control the
governed; and in the next place oblige it to control itself. A dependence on the
people is, no doubt, the primary control on the government; but experience has
taught mankind the necessity of auxiliary precautions.57
Regarding the importance of a written constitution and its construction, Thomas Jefferson
reflected, "I had rather ask an enlargement of power from the nation, where it is found
necessary, than to assume it by a construction which would make our powers boundless.
Our particular security is in a written Constitution. Let us not make it a blank paper by

56

Barton, supra note 22, at 6.

57

James Madison, The Federalist No. 51 319-20 (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961).
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construction."58 Evidenced by the preceding historical accounts, early influential
Americans perceived the construction of America's written Constitution as involving a
certain amount of governmental restraint.
If a written constitution is to serve the function of keeping government within its
lawful bounds, then there must be some check to guarantee that the government is
actually obeying the law. As Chief Justice Marshall enunciated in 1803 shortly after the
creation of the U.S. Constitution, "it is emphatically the province and duty of the judicial
department to say what law is."59 Prior to the monumental decision of Marbury v.
Madison, the judicial branch had not exercised the function of judicial review.
Nevertheless, Alexander Hamilton, in Federalist 78 in 1788, only one year after the
Constitution's drafting, enunciated:
It is not otherwise to be supposed, that the Constitution could intend to enable the
representatives of the people to substitute their will to that of their constituents. It
is far more rational to suppose, that the courts were designed to be an intermediate
body between the people and the legislature, in order, among other things, to keep
the latter within the limits assigned to their authority. The interpretation of the
laws is the proper and peculiar province of the courts. A constitution is, in fact,
and must be regarded by the judges, as a fundamental law. It, therefore, belongs to
them to ascertain its meaning, as well as the meaning of any particular act
proceeding from the legislative body. If there should happen to be an
irreconcilable variance between the two, that which has the superior obligation
and validity ought, of course, to be preferred; or, in other words, the Constitution
ought to be preferred to the statute, the intention of the people to the intention of
their agents. 60

58

Thomas Jefferson, Letter to Wilson C. Nicholas, in Thomas Jefferson: Letters and
Addresses 154, 154 (William B. Parker and Jonas Viles eds., 1908).
59
60

Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. 137, 177 (1803).

Alexander Hamilton, The Federalist No. 78: The Judiciary (1788),
http://www.constitution.org/fed/federa78.htm
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Thus, the drafters of the Constitution, or at the very least certain drafters, foresaw the role
of the judicial branch as interpreting the Constitution and statutes, and preferring the
former when in conflict with the latter.
Early Interpretive Approach Utilized by the Supreme Court
In addition to perspectives of European legal scholars such as Blackstone on
constitutional interpretation, the early Supreme Court justices' perspectives on
constitutional interpretation provide further evidence as to the method of interpretation
envisioned by the drafters of the U.S. Constitution. The early Court's approach was
presumably influenced by the founders' own perspective on constitutional interpretation.
Justice Felix Frankfurter summarized the early Court's approach in Wallace v. Jaffree:
"What governs is the Constitution, and not what we have written about it."61 The case of
Chisholm v. Georgia (1793) also illustrates the early Supreme Court's rationale, which
relied upon the original intent of the drafters. In reaching their decision, Justice Iredell,62
deliberated, "The framers of the Constitution, I presume, must have meant one of two
things . . ."63 Such commentary indicates how some of the first Supreme Court justices
viewed the intention of the founders as extremely relevant in determining the meaning
and application of the law to the cases at hand.
Another early Supreme Court decision that relied upon the intention of the
founders in its rationale is the Church of the Holy Trinity v. U.S. decision. In this case, a
61

John Eidsmoe, Christianity and the Constitution 397 (1987), quoting Justice Felix
Frankfurter, Wallace v. Jaffree 472 U.S. 38 (1985).
62

Justice James Iredell of North Carolina was a prominent American lawyer who
received his legal education in England; Iredell was also a delegate to the Federal Convention.
James McClellan, Liberty, Order, and Justice: An Introduction to the Constitutional Principles of
American Government 33 (2000).
63

Chisholm v. Georgia, 2 U.S. 419, 432 (1793).
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church in New York was being prosecuted for violating a statute enacted for the purpose
of preventing the importation of foreign labor to build western railroads. The church was
accused of violating the law by hiring an English clergyman. The Court, however,
reasoned:
It is a familiar rule that a thing may be within the letter of the statute and not
within the statute, because not within its spirit, not within the intention of its
makers . . . Frequently words of general meaning are used in a statute, words
broad enough to include an act in question, and yet a consideration of the whole
legislation, or of the circumstances surrounding its enactment, or of the absurd
results which follow from giving such broad meaning to the words, makes it
unreasonable to believe that the legislator intended to include the particular act.64
Thus, the Court in the Holy Trinity case relied heavily upon the intention of the legislator
in reaching its decision.
Similarly, in Marbury v. Madison, which established the legitimacy of judicial
review, Chief Justice Marshall clearly relies upon a textual or historical basis of
constitutional interpretation as the basis for judicial review:
'No person,' says the constitution, 'shall be convicted of treason unless on the
testimony of two witnesses to the fame overt act, or on confession in open court.'
Here the language of the constitution is addressed especially to the courts. It
prescribes, directly for them, a rule of evidence not to be departed from. If the
legislature should change that rule, and declare one witness, or a confession out of
court, sufficient for conviction, must the constitutional principle yield to the
legislative act? From these, and many other selections which might be made, it is
apparent, that the framers of the constitution contemplated that instrument, as a
rule for the government of courts, as well as of the legislature.65
Marshall, in addition to the preceding cases, further demonstrates that the early Supreme
Court relied upon the meaning of the Constitution's words as well as the intention of its

64

Church of the Holy Trinity v. U.S., 143 U.S. 457, 459 (1892) quoted in David Barton,
Original Intent: The Courts, the Constitution, and Religion 147 (1996) (emphasis added).
65

Marbury, 5 U.S. at 179-80 (emphasis added).
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authors. In short, while justices did not always claim to be certain of the intention of the
Constitution's drafters, they did seek to discern their intent.
Moving Away From Early Intentions
The court did not embrace any idea of "living constitutionalism" until much later
in U.S. history.66 It was not until the prevailing positivism of the 1870s when
Christopher Columbus Langdell introduced the case-law study method that constitutional
adjudication began to markedly change.67 This new approach focused upon judicial
decisions rather than the Constitution itself.68 The case-law approach viewed the
intentions of the founders as irrelevant and even a hindrance to the "successful evolution
of society."69
Numerous legal theorists throughout the 1900s began espousing similar views of
legal positivism.70 John Dewey, a leading relativist of the time, clearly articulates the
change in legal philosophy from Blackstone's traditional approach to Langdell's positivist

66

Barton, supra note 22, at 228. Living constitutionalism is a theory of jurisprudence "in
which constitutional provisions are unmoored from their originalist grounding and interpreted to
meet present societal needs." Adam Winkler, A Revolution Too Soon: Woman Suffragists and
The "Living Constitution," 76 N.Y.U.L. Rev. 1456, 1457.
67

Barton, supra note 22, at 228. Harvard Law School Dean Christopher Columbus
Langdell is most famous for his efforts as a law professor, substituting the study of cases for the
previously used lectures and textbooks. William Schofield, Christopher Columbus Langdell, 55
The American Law Register 273, 273, 278.
68

Barton, supra note 22, at 228.

69

Id.

70

Id. Constitutional scholar and law professor John Eidsmoe describes legal positivism
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approach, "The belief in political fixity, of the sanctity of some form of state consecrated
by the efforts of our fathers and hallowed by tradition, is one of the stumbling-blocks in
the way of orderly and directed change."71 Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr.72 echoed a similar
pronouncement in 1902: "The justification of a law for us cannot be found in the fact that
our fathers always have followed it. It must be found in some help which the law brings
toward reaching a social end."73 The scientific approach to the law brought with it a
sense that the law should change with the evolving needs of society.
The influence of positivist philosophy increased following Langdell's case-law
method, and positivist philosophy continues to inspire legal theorists to this day. Justice
Cardozo stated in 1921, "I take judge-made law as one of the existing realities of life."74
Additionally, Justice Charles Evans Hughes emphatically stated, "We are under a
Constitution, but the Constitution is what the judge says it is."75 This changing
perspective of constitutional adjudication began to influence not only the thinking of
legal scholars, but the methods of judicial decision-making in America's courts.
It was not until 1958 that such evolutionary legal reasoning would make its way
into a U.S. Supreme Court case. That case was Trop v. Dulles, which declared it "cruel
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and unusual punishment" to revoke the citizenship of a U.S. citizen as a form of
punishment.76 In Trop v. Dulles, then Chief Justice Warren established what would
become a dominant basis for future Supreme Court decisions by boldly declaring that the
Eighth Amendment "must draw its meaning from the evolving standards of decency that
mark the progress of a maturing society."77 Chief Justice Warren's decision to declare a
Constitutional Amendment bound to the changing preferences of society set the Court
upon a dangerous path leading even farther away from the original meaning of the
Constitution.
Today, the Supreme Court has shifted even farther from the original
understanding of the Constitution by discovering in the "emanations of the penumbras of
the Constitution" everything from a Constitutional right to privacy78 to a right to pursue
an occupation.79 Such rights, while not explicitly mentioned in the Constitution are,
according to Justice Douglas, necessary in order to give substance to the rights
enumerated. Douglas asserts, "The foregoing cases suggest that specific guarantees in
the Bill of Rights have penumbras, formed by emanations from those guarantees that
help give them life and substance."80 In sum, the Court's reasoning not only relies upon
the specific enumeration of rights in the Constitution but also upon whatever additional
rights the Justices deem necessary to grant those enumerated rights "life and substance."81
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The next section of this paper will examine one specific example where the result
of interpreting the Constitution without a standard has created conflicting law. This
example illustrates the current need for an established standard of interpretation to ensure
that the law provides stability and certainty for those who live under its authority.
Interpreting Without a Standard: Separation of Church and State
Recently, a school in Giles County, VA received a letter from an attorney
informing them that their display of the Ten Commandments is unconstitutional and
urging the school to remove their "unconstitutional" display.82 The school board
promptly removed the display of the Ten Commandments.83 However, negative
responses from concerned parents eventually prompted the school board to return the Ten
Commandments to their original place in the school.84 This is just one example
illustrating the difficulty of constitutional interpretation. One side was adamant that the
display was unconstitutional, while the other, with equal vehemence, declared the display
wholly constitutional. Nonetheless, the Constitution does not explicitly address the
question of religious displays in public schools. In order to make a judgment regarding
the question of such displays, the Supreme Court must interpret the Establishment Clause
of the First Amendment.
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The First Amendment, states simply, "Congress shall make no law respecting an
establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof . . ."85 Hence, in
deciding a specific case involving a "separation of church and state" question, the court
must ascertain the meaning and legal application of the Establishment Clause. The
difficulties with the Supreme Court's doctrine of "separation of church and state" clearly
present the need for an interpretive standard. In order to examine the current difficulties
surrounding the lack of such a standard, this section will examine the original intent of
the Establishment Clause and how the Court initially interpreted it, followed by an
examination of the Court's changing interpretations of the Clause based upon
contradictory standards and conflicting judgments. Lastly, this section will examine the
current Establishment Clause confusion created and the conflicting results reached due to
an absent standard of interpretation.
The Original Meaning of the Establishment Clause
The case that first introduced the phrase "separation of church and state" into the
rhetoric of the Supreme Court was the 1947 Everson v. Board of Education case.86 In
this case, the Court emphatically declared, "The First Amendment has erected a wall
between church and state. That wall must be kept high and impregnable. We could not
approve the slightest breach."87 Yet, the phrase "separation of church and state" is found
nowhere in the Constitution. Whether the original intent of the Establishment Clause was
85
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to "erect a wall between church and state" can be ascertained by examining documents
and debates written during the Constitution's construction and adoption.
First, the original purpose of the Bill of Rights should inform any understanding
of the original intent of the Establishment Clause. The Bill of Rights was essentially a
concession to certain anti-federalists who were wary of adopting the Constitution.88 The
anti-federalists feared that the national government would become so powerful that it
would interfere with the people's free exercise of religion; the Bill of rights was never
originally intended to be directed against the states.89 The Establishment Clause
specifically states that, "Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of
religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof . . ."90 The fact that seven states had
established religions at the time the Constitution was adopted further evidences the
assertion that it was Congress' authority — and not the states’ authority — that was
directly limited by the Establishment Clause.91
Second, the intention of the Establishment Clause was to promote the Free
Exercise Clause, not hinder it.92 The intention of the Establishment Clause was not to
prevent the national government from interfering in religious affairs entirely, as there are
88

Robert G. Natelson, The Original Meaning of the Establishment Clause, 14 Wm. &
Mary Bill Rts. J. 73, 79 (2005).
89

Barron v. Baltimore 32 U.S. 243, 247-51 (1833). In this case, then Supreme Court
Justice Marshall stated, "In almost every convention by which the constitution was adopted,
amendments to guard against the abuse of power were recommended. These amendments
demanded security against the apprehended encroachments of the general government — not
against those of the local governments." Id. at 250.
90

U.S. Const. Amend. 1.

91

Jonathan Elliot, The Debates in the Several State Conventions on the Adoption of the
Federal Constitution 122 (2nd ed., 1836).
92

Natelson, supra note 88, at 129. The free exercise clause states simply, "or prohibiting
the free exercise thereof . . ."

CONSTITUTIONAL INTERPRETATION

26

numerous early examples of the government even "promoting" theism specifically.93 The
Establishment Clause, along with the Free Exercise Clause, was intended to promote
liberty of conscience, a right that the founders of the United States of America valued
highly. James Madison, in his Memorial and Remonstrance against Religious
Assessments (1785), asserted:
The Religion then of every man must be left to the conviction and conscience of
every man; and it is the right of every man to exercise it as these may dictate. This
right is in its nature an unalienable right. It is unalienable, because the opinions of
men, depending only on the evidence contemplated by their own minds cannot
follow the dictates of other men.94
Thomas Jefferson echoed a similar pronouncement:
But our rulers can have no authority over such natural rights, only as we have
submitted to them. The rights of conscience we never submitted, we could not
submit. We are answerable for them to our God. The legitimate powers of
government extend to such acts only as are injurious to others. But it does me no
injury for my neighbour to say there are twenty gods, or no God. It neither picks
my pocket nor breaks my leg.95
Another influential early American, Rector of Yale College Elisha Williams, stated
regarding liberty of conscience,
Every man has an equal right to follow the dictates of his own conscience in the
affairs of religion. Every one is under an indispensable obligation to search the
scripture for himself (which contains the whole of it) and to make the best use of
it he can for his own information in the will of God, the nature and duties of
Christianity. And as every Christian is so bound; so he has an unalienable right to
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judge of the sense and meaning of it, and to follow his judgment wherever it leads
him; even an equal right with any rulers be they civil or ecclesiastical.96
Thus, the Establishment Clause was adopted to prevent Congress from instituting a
national religion, and more broadly to prohibit the government from favoring or
promoting one religion to the detriment of another which would have also violated liberty
of conscience.97 The original understanding of the Establishment Clause encompassed
principles of liberty of conscience, freedom of religious expression, religious pluralism
and equality, and separation of church from state.98 Later interpretations of the
Establishment Clause failed to consider its complete original understanding; rather,
separation of church from state became the sole focus of Establishment Clause
decisions.99
The Current Meaning of the Establishment Clause
In recent decades, the Supreme Court has been interpreting the Establishment
Clause in a manner inconsistent with and, in some cases, contrary to its original purpose.
Such decisions resulted from shaky interpretative grounds. For example, the Supreme
Court ruled in Marsh v. Chambers that it is constitutional for chaplains in Congress to
pray,100 while twenty-one years earlier in Engel v. Vitale the Court held that it is
unconstitutional for students to recite similar prayers in schools.101 Moreover, in 1992
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the Court decided that it was unconstitutional for students to hear prayers in public
meetings.102 The Supreme Court held in 1984 that a crèche in a shopping center may
constitutionally be displayed,103 but in 1989, the Court held that such a display of a
crèche in a courthouse is unconstitutional.104
Additionally, the Court decided in Stone v. Graham that it was unconstitutional to
display the Ten Commandments in schools, arguing that: "If the posted copies of the Ten
Commandments are to have any effect at all, it will be to induce the schoolchildren to
read, meditate upon, perhaps to venerate and obey, the Commandments."105 In Stone v.
Graham the Court utilized the previously established Lemon test to determine whether
the display was constitutional.106 The Court ruled that the display did not pass
constitutional muster because it violated the first prong of the Lemon test, which requires
statutes to have a "secular legislative purpose."107 The Court also declared in McCreary
v. ACLU that the display of the Ten Commandments in the Kentucky County Courthouse
was unconstitutional because the objective of the display was "predominantly
religious,"108 and thus, failed to pass the secular legislative purpose prong of the Lemon
test as well as the neutrality test instituted in Everson v. Board of Ed. of Ewing.109
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However, the Court held in Van Orden v. Perry that the Ten Commandments
could be constitutionally displayed on public property if the purpose of the display is
based on its historical meaning and passive use.110 The Court concluded that the
Establishment Clause requires "that we neither abdicate our responsibility to maintain a
division between church and state nor evince a hostility to religion by disabling the
government from in some ways recognizing our religious heritage."111 Van Orden
declared in respect to the religious nature of the Commandments that, "Simply having
religious content or promoting a message consistent with a religious doctrine does not run
afoul of the Establishment Clause."112 Distinguishing the display in this case from the
displays in public school settings in Stone, Schempp, and Engel, the Court held that the
display in the legislative chamber was representative of Texas' legal and political history,
and thus, not violative of the Establishment Clause.113
What can explain the Court's various interpretations of the Establishment Clause?
Most certainly, the words of the Constitution and the original intent of men long deceased
has not changed. Therefore, the change must be a result of the changing interpretation of
the Constitution's words. As evidenced by the preceding cases, failure to base judicial
decisions upon the original intent of the Constitution results in a Constitution whose
meaning changes with each judge's relative perspective.
Based upon the preceding cases, it is clear why the Giles County School Board
was uncertain as to the constitutionality of their display of the Ten Commandments.
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Ultimately, there is precedent to support either side of the debate. However, if the basis
for the decision is the original intent of the Establishment Clause, the result is much more
certain. Ultimately, basing such constitutional decisions upon original intent allows
judges to rely upon a standard which surpasses their own opinion.
Justice Antonin Scalia's dissent in Lee v. Weisman demonstrates how an
originalist rationale was employed to reach a conclusion in an Establishment Clause
case.114 Scalia demonstrates the importance of relying upon a foundation that supersedes
the changing philosophies of judges.115 He states, "Today's opinion shows more
forcefully than volumes of argumentation why our Nation's protection, that fortress
which is our Constitution, cannot possibly rest upon the changeable philosophical
predilections of the Justices of this Court, but must have deep foundations in the historic
practices of our people."116 Scalia's also cites Justice Brennan's concurrence in School
Dist. of Abington v. Schempp stating, "The line we must draw between the permissible
and the impermissible is one which accords with history and faithfully reflects the
understanding of the Founding Fathers."117 In order to reach such a conclusion, Scalia
considers the original purpose of the Establishment Clause, citing early cases that
demonstrate the founders' opinions on its purpose. In reaching his conclusion, Scalia
argues:
Thus, while I have no quarrel with the Court's general proposition that the
Establishment Clause 'guarantees that government may not coerce anyone to

114

Lee, 505 U.S. at 631-646.

115

Id. at 632.

116

Id.

117

School Dist. of Abington v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203, 294 (1963).

CONSTITUTIONAL INTERPRETATION

31

support or participate in religion or its exercise,'118 I see no warrant for expanding
the concept of coercion beyond acts backed by threat of penalty -- a brand of
coercion that, happily, is readily discernible to those of us who have made a
career of reading the disciples of Blackstone rather than of Freud. The Framers
were indeed opposed to coercion of religious worship by the National
Government; but, as their own sponsorship of nonsectarian prayer in public events
demonstrates, they understood that 'speech is not coercive; the listener may do as
he likes.'119
Scalia bases his reasoning upon the original intent of the drafters of the Establishment
Clause. In determining the founders' intentions, he consults the Constitution itself, the
Declaration of Independence, as well as early writings and cases that interpreted the
Establishment Clause.120 While consulting the original intent is not without its faults, at
the very minimum, it provides an interpretive foundation for judicial decision-making.
Establishment Clause decisions that ignore the original intent of the Constitution
often reach conclusions diametrically opposed to the framers' original purpose for the
Establishment Clause. Justice Kennedy's majority opinion in Lee v. Weisman
demonstrates this very problem, as his conclusion opposed the very purpose for which
that provision was written:
The lessons of the First Amendment are as urgent in the modern world as in the
18th century when it was written. One timeless lesson is that if citizens are
subjected to state-sponsored religious exercises, the State disavows its own duty
to guard and respect that sphere of inviolable conscience and belief which is the
mark of a free people. To compromise that principle today would be to deny our
own tradition and forfeit our standing to urge others to secure the protections of
that tradition for themselves.121
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Though he appears to rely upon a long-standing historical tradition, this is simply not the
case.
In 1864, Mr. Meacham, of the House Committee on the Judiciary, made the
following pronouncement: "What is an establishment of religion? It must have a creed,
defining what a man must believe; it must have ministers of defined qualifications, to
teach the doctrines and administer the rites; it must have tests for the submissive and
penalties for the non-conformist. There never was an established religion without all
these . . ."122 While this is a rather narrow view of the Establishment Clause, even a
broader view allowed numerous religious "activities" to continue.123 The early broader
view of the Establishment Clause simply required government impartiality concerning
religion.124 Kennedy's conclusion that a constitutional provision written to prevent
Congress from establishing a religion, and more broadly, from favoring one religion over
another prevents a non-sectarian prayer from being offered at a public high-school
graduation ceremony is without merit. Kennedy may reach this conclusion based upon
prior precedent,125 or upon the evolving standards of society, but not upon original intent.
The contradictory decisions reached by the Supreme Court speak to the need for a
consistent standard of interpretation. Rule of law depends upon the ability of citizens to
122
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know and understand the laws that govern them.126 As the Supreme Court's decisions
increasingly create new law rather than interpret a stable, established law that individuals
can understand and follow, the people of the United States of America are moving further
away from the protection afforded by the rule of law.
Analysis
The Constitution of the United States is so cherished for its ability to protect
against the tyrannical rule of men; yet, if it is built upon nothing more than subjective
opinions of that law, those opinions will supersede the Constitution itself. Supreme
Court Justice Antonin Scalia stated in an interview to NPR news:
If you somehow adopt a philosophy that the Constitution itself is not static, but
rather it morphs from age to age to say whatever it ought to say — which is
probably whatever the people would want it to say — you eliminate the whole
purpose of a Constitution. And that is essentially what the so-called living
Constitution leaves you with.127
This paper suggests that judges should treat the Constitution as a written document with
fixed meaning. Judicial review and other critical Supreme Court doctrines should find
their authority in the "writtenness" of the Constitution:
The Constitution is, among other things, a legal document, and it is on the
Constitution's status as written law that justification of the practice of judicial
review has largely rested. As Edwin Corwin once wrote, 'The first and most
obvious fact about the Constitution of the United States is that it is a document.'
Justice Black began his lectures on constitutional interpretation by saying, 'It is of
paramount importance to me that our country has a written constitution.' With
words like these, contemporary constitutional interpreters hark back to John
Marshall's original argument for judicial review in Marbury v. Madison, an
argument permeated with reliance on the 'writtenness' of the Constitution.128
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As a letter written to a friend contains words with specific meanings organized to
articulate a specific message, so the Constitution contains words carefully chosen to
convey a particular meaning.
The emphasis upon the Constitution as a written document lends much support to
the interpretive approach of originalism. While recognizing certain difficulties that arise
with utilizing this interpretive method, this paper suggests that originalism provides the
clearest lens through which to read the Constitution. Furthermore, in consideration of the
history of constitutional interpretation, it is clear that the initial idea of constitutional
interpretation included a consideration of the intention of the framers of the Constitution.
Finally, the current difficulties created by the Supreme Court's reliance upon
numerous alternative interpretive, or noninterpretive, methods of adjudication illustrate
the need for a consistent standard of interpretation to ensure the Constitution continues to
maintain its place as the supreme law of the land. Attorney General Edwin Meese stated,
regarding the current shift in constitutional interpretation:
It was not so long ago when constitutional interpretation was understood to move
between roles of 'strict construction' and 'loose construction.' Today, it is argued
that constitutional interpretation moves between 'interpretive review' and 'noninterpretive review.' As one observer has pointed out, under the old system the
question was how to read the Constitution; under the new approach, the question
is whether to read the Constitution. The result is that some judges and academics
feel free to roam at large in the trackless fields of their own imaginations.129
Without a consistent meaning, the Constitution becomes whatever the judges say it is.
Such construction of the Supreme Law of the Land renders the Constitution meaningless
and erodes the stability the Constitution was intended to provide.
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Conclusion
In view of the history of the American judicial system and the current difficulties
created by the Supreme Court's shift away from considering the original intent of the
Constitution, this paper suggests that the only solution is to abandon the relativism of a
"living Constitution" and to consider once again the original intent of the Constitution's
framers. What began as an experiment in written constitutionalism has become a
standard for nations throughout the world today. In order to preserve the unique
American constitutional order and system, this paper urges America's courts to return to
an objective standard of interpretation when deciding cases. In Lewis Carroll's Through
the Looking Glass, Humpty Dumpty has a conversation with Alice where the meaning of
words is purely subjective, "'When I use a word, 'Humpty Dumpty said in rather a
scornful tone, 'it means just what I choose it to mean -- neither more nor less.' 'The
question is,' said Alice, 'whether you can make words mean so many different things.'"130
Will America’s courts continue to follow the precedent set by Humpty Dumpty, or will
they instead return to considering the objective meaning of the Constitution?
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